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Zhumaganbetov Talgat Smagulovich

ANCIENT TURKIC KAGANATE: formation and development of statehood. 6th-8th centuries Almaty, 2017 

Chapter from the monograph

1.3Pre-state institutions of the Kok-Turkic society.

     On the question of “tribe”. Before we touch upon the question of the prerequisites for the formation of a state organization, we must, within the framework of this study, resolve the issue of tribes among nomads. Most people who touched on this topic have a Hegelian-Engels understanding of this concept, as part of the link between the clan and the people (as an ethnos). According to this theory, the clan is united into a tribe, which in turn is a kind of proto-ethnos. Tribes, having passed a certain stage of development, form a nation at a new level.

          Наша попытка наложить эту теорию on the history of the Kok-Turks ended in failure. Under the "tribe" in relation to the ancient Turks, they often understand various types of union of clans on a regional economic basis. Ethnological studies of the origins of clans have shown that in such unions of clans - referred to in the historical literature as “tribes”, the genealogical principle does not work. This explains, in our opinion, that in a nomadic society, the principles of relationship only on the basis of genealogical principles of kinship have long given way to economic ones, and there was no need for the functioning of the tribe, as it was in the primitive period and as a taxonomic level. In the ancient Turkic society, the concept of “og” and “bod” is used to designate this phenomenon. But “og” was a tribal division in the pre-state period. The ten-legged division of the Kok-Turkic state organization for 200 years and reproduced in all khaganates (Western, two Eastern) allows us to consider this “og” an administrative-territorial unit of the state, and not a tribe. The deciphering of the word “budun” from runic texts as a “tribal union”, proposed by V.V.

       В зависимости от традиции и порядка сложения данного объединения, роды - инициаторы распространяют на incorporators the principle of seniority and the natural hierarchy of subordination of clans (the principle of patronymy). Therefore, the concept of "tribe" must be attributed to the conditional. Modern ethnologists are extremely cautious about this concept, because. it often means a wide range of ethno-economic associations over a long historical period. There is no such concept in the vocabulary of the Turkic-speaking peoples. In order to avoid confusion, due to the long use of this term in certain cases, we will also continue to use this concept, but in the context we mean that a tribe is an association or union of clans without a deep ethnological meaning.

      By birth we provide for the union of a certain number of communities (argumentation in section 2). So, in terms of content, the military organization of nomads in scientific literature practically merges with such concepts as “tribe” and is characterized by relations in the form of “military democracy”.

       Сложность и запутанность вопроса о том, что представляет собой такое явление, как племя , comes from an uncritical confusion of its ethnographic and state-theoretical meaning. The greatest discrepancy in this concept was introduced by ethnographers, who, in order to identify the essential characteristics and main features of the tribe, by comparing with various associations, from antiquity to the present, using materials from different continents, instead of identifying universal signs and patterns, only confused and aggravated the problem.

   Let's review this issue. So, Yu.I. Semenov, characterizes the classical tribe as an organizational entity with common authorities. “People who were part of such a tribe,” writes Yu.I. Semenov, “usually had a common culture, spoke the same language or dialect of the same language” 131, p.73. They were aware of their common features in culture and difference from foreign groups. All these signs, according to the scientist, characterize the tribe as an ethnic community and at the same time as a whole social organism, the border of the tribe, thus, passes through a person in this circle.

          _cc781905-5cde-3194 -bb3b-136bad5cf58d_According to S.A. Tokarev, “the tribe as a cultural ethnic unit has probably existed since the beginning of human history, but only at the end of the communal-clan era, at the stage of barbarism, the tribe becomes a compact, cohesive social group: intra-tribal ties are strengthened , general tribal authorities are formed: tribal council, leaders, military leaders” 132, p.266.

          Племенная структура строится на родственно -genealogical basis, however, as G.E. Markov, this principle operates only at the very bottom of the social structure. In fact, the tribe, in his opinion, is a historically established element of social organization, which is preserved in the form of a tribal principle of economic territory even after the sedentarization of nomads 133; 134, p.83.

          А.С.Аманжолов , based on extensive material, at the level of ethnic divisions - clans and tribes, distinguishes separate dialects and adverbs. This moment additionally characterizes the process of formation of medieval peoples 7, pp.28-29.

      a category that is absent in the structure of the nomadic society. For nomads, this concept means, in their understanding, associative groups of communities and a military-potest organization, associations of collectives, pastoralists with compactly located summer pastures 111, p.150-155.

      _cc781905-5f.b.b.c Kotenko: “The presence of a management organization in the form of a military democracy indicates that this society has reached its peak in the development of the tribal system; that phenomena have already appeared here that speak of the beginning of its decomposition, and all the necessary prerequisites for the emergence of the state have been created ... ”135, p.72. With the correction that the tribal society in the arid zone ceased to exist as early as the end of the Bronze Age, this excerpt fully reflects the stage essence of the phenomenon we are studying.

      _cc781905-5cde-3194-bb3 Khazanov identifies the military organization of the early nomads with “situational chiefdoms”, “fluid in their composition”, with an association that temporarily arose during the wars 80, p.370.

      In our opinion, in most of the period in political history under the tribe of the nomads, most state historians permanently mean military organizations. Such a military alliance of nomads carries within itself the structure of military democracy, with an existing tendency to turn it into early forms of state associations. This idea is most clearly expressed by B.F. Zhelezchikov, who notes that “for pastoralists, the production cycle is already provided at the lower levels of their social organization”, therefore, tribal unions are caused by military-political reasons 136, pp. 108-109.

      existed among the Turks. “Og” / “ogush” - the ancient Turks, in the pre-state period, is the economic cooperation of small and extended communities, “budun” is the union of “ogs” into a people (with ethnic coloring), “oguz”, - the union of clans for political purposes. Not "og" not "oguz" are not natural stages of ethnogenesis. Their leading vector is the economic interests of the communities.

Pre-State Economic Coordination Authority. Most experts believe that pastoral nomadism is a form of human adaptation to a given ecosystem, "... through seasonal migration along certain routes ...", to ensure "... not only the reproduction of the herd ...", but also for the normal functioning of the exploited ecosystem 137, p.32 -33. There is a statement by A.M.Khazanov that this is “... a special type of producing economy, in which the predominant occupation is extensive mobile cattle breeding, and most of the population is involved in periodic migrations” 80, p.173. These characteristics allow us to come to the conclusion that a balanced balance in this system cannot be maintained independently, since one of the two is the subject of impact on the environment - an unnatural phenomenon. Any cyclic movement of large masses of livestock and people (more details in section 2) requires a special organization. Unsystematic use of pasture areas limited by nature and climate leads to irregulation of the processes of reproduction of steppe vegetation and, ultimately, to an ecological catastrophe, and it, in turn, to an economic and social catastrophe: mass death of animals, people, weakening and collapse of society.

       Как мы выяснили, без макро регулирования кочевого скотоводства в определенном регионе, локальной экологической niche, nomadic pastoralism as an economy, as a material base for a specific society and culture is impossible. Like any living organization, nomadic pastoralism is characterized by a struggle of contradictions. In this case, two tendencies, on the one hand, the attraction to calm and stability, which is necessary for this type of animal husbandry, and on the other hand, continuous clashes at the intra- and inter-society level due to the growth of individual societies, lack of economic territory or changes in the boundaries of local ecological niches .

         Регуляторами этих тенденций на внутрисоциумном уровне various organizations of nomads act. Basically, this is a heterogeneous, supra-communal, non-political power from the natural need to regulate the complex intergroup relationships that have arisen in a particular community 138, p.78, 82-83. Similar positions are held by N.E.Masanov. If the relations are basically economic, then this is an economic potestariat, and if there are military problems, then it is a military potestariat, and so on 111, p.155-160. The organs of economic coordination in nomadic societies have a lower boundary between the family and the community; the military begins with an extended community. The highest form of inter-communal and supra-communal organization is political power, the state.

    An economic, inter-clan body for coordinating the economic cycle, is the first natural and objective form of supra-communal and inter-communal power. "Building brick", with the help of which, under certain circumstances, state institutions can appear. This form of pre-state power gives organizational integrity to various economic steppe entities, unites economic and communal interests and forces other nomadic associations to act in concert, in the interests of the entire organization, while its components retain full independence in all other matters, and the central government bodies on along with the figure of the macroregulator are of a pronounced collective nature. The other side of such associations is the armed protection of economic interests. In this case, these are pre-state bodies of military protection, which in certain circumstances become pre-state military institutions of power.

     Objectively, these institutions exist autonomously, from the presence or absence of a state organization in a nomadic society Without these institutions for coordinating economic activity and protecting property and economic interests, nomadic pastoralism in the medieval version could not function. At the same time, the presence of these bodies were the reasons and prerequisites for the relatively early formation of both individual and systemic state institutions among the nomads.

       К особенностям генерирования догосударственных и государственных структур управления у древних тюрок, как мы писали above, the economic base - pastoralism - had a great influence.

     Разделение всего аридного пространства по хозяйственным зонам, ограниченность вегетационных периодов у степной растительности, огромное поголовье скота, низкая кормовая емкость и продуктивность pastures, the complexity and multifactorial nature of nomadism were the reasons for the special regulation of economic cycles.

       В зависимости от природных особенностей аридная зона делится на хозяйственные регионы ниши. In economic, global and organizational terms, this is formalized into economic areas with their prevailing landscape and natural and climatic conditions. In each of these areas, economic activity was carried out by certain groups of tribal associations. From their representatives, a council of the ancestral rulers of the region was formed, which coordinated the migration process and other issues. As a rule, this council met before the start of a new economic cycle and determined the main routes for clans or clan associations.

     It is easy to imagine what would have happened to economic migrations in the absence of such an institution of management. In this case, all tribal and their communal divisions would choose one or two of the most convenient, optimal and best routes. The communities that are ahead of the migration, in order to maintain leadership in the conditions of the first capture of temporary summer pastures, will not fully utilize the fodder resources of pastures along the nomadic route, and outsiders will get only trampled spaces. Neither the leaders of nomads, nor the latter receive normal conditions for the natural reproduction of the herd, serious damage is caused to the environment, etc.

         Распределение кочевых путей, таким образом , between the clans of association was an inevitable condition for the pasture-nomadic production system. Otherwise, “the entire system of nomadism would be disrupted, chaos would begin in land use, which would lead to predatory extermination of pastures and death of livestock,” notes V.F. Shakhmatov 139, p.33. In order to prevent this from happening, this side of the economic activity of nomads is first of all subject to special regulation.

    The leaders of the communities, clans and the ordinary nomads of one economic region themselves elected a special regulator who, within his competence, stood above the clan communities and relied on the collective, supra-clan authority of the elders kind. This power was formally elected by everyone and on equal terms. Such regulators, as a rule, were representatives of the clans that made the greatest contribution to the efficiency of this economic season due to a number of natural circumstances: the largest number of people and livestock, the richest, strongest and most influential clan in the steppe hierarchy, etc. For such regulators in the pre-state period, the Turkic ethnic groups adopted many names. We, in order not to be confused with the administrative position of the same name and class title, we will call them economic macro-regulators.

        Хозяйственный макрорегулятор занимался, исходя из своего опыта, знаний и авторитета, организацией migration process, i.e. direct distribution between the clans of nomadic routes and pastures within the economic joint region, arbitration in the event of a clash of economic interests of various communities. The clan rulers distributed the routes between individual communities in the indicated directions, and the expanded communities of clans, moving along a parallel route, took temporary possession of the pastures located along the path by first capture 140, p. 48, 85. First of all, nomadic routes were subjected to distribution and regulation. Each group of clans owned a territory in the form of a wide strip of many kilometers, in which there were nomadic routes and pastures, mainly belonging to them. For example, Ustyurt in ancient times was the habitat of only the Dakhs and the upper Aorses, and later the Adai clan. In the east of Kazakhstan, in the Irtysh region from the 13th century. predominantly Naimans and Kereites. The Turks in the 5th-6th centuries The zones of economic regulation were individual mountain valleys of the Altai, the foothills of the Sayan Mountains and the Orkhon River basin.

       В период каганата данный совет родоправителей, представлявших хозяйственное объединение десяти огов, называемый тюркютами Elem, will be replenished with other influential subjects of power and will turn into a council of the nobility, which for a long time will be covered by the "presidium" of the general people's assembly - kurultai. Each of the tribal associations that were part of this council of tribal rulers had its own elected regulator, who had power within the framework of his competence as an economic coordinator, but already within the allotted route. Over time, this route was assigned to a specific clan within the tribe and an extended community within the clan, which did not prevent the issue of distributing nomadic routes again every year. Under difficult natural and weather conditions, individual Turkut ogushs could vary their nomadic routes, if necessary, by agreement, move during a period of disaster (juta) even to the lands of neighboring tribes (clan associations), but such movements were exceptional and contractual in nature.

      The power of the elder was based on the trust of society, the order of the elder could not be disobeyed” 141, p.252. The leaders of the small and extended communities held real power. At the level of intercommunal cooperation of the clan, the ruler of the clan had regulatory and coordinating power on an advisory basis. In its essence, tribal power is a logical continuation of intra-family power-subordination relations, i.e. patronymics. The leader of the association of clans had the same power. Depending on the number of united economic units, even the limited powers of regulators and organizers of migration sometimes reached significant volumes. This body of economic coordination is a form of emergence of a new supra-communal, supra-tribal power, which in its essence and content is seriously different from the former tribal one. The economic body of coordination has no direct connection with patronymy, but uses its tools.

      As a rule, an economic macro-regulator is a person rich, wealthy and authoritative in the economic life of a nomad. He came to the fore at the expense of personal qualities of character and intellect. In addition to personal influence, he has the prestige of wealth (we do not exclude the practice of reciprocal distributions) and, of course, deep knowledge of the natural laws of the region and all the details of the economic cycle.

      The competence of the economic macroregulator included issues of land ownership and land ownership to economic arbitration. On other issues, this khan had no real vested power. Intra-tribal issues were resolved by the clans themselves. The power of the economic coordinator was temporary, and the volume and effectiveness of this power depended on the personal qualities of the elected manager, military, natural and other circumstances.

      Thus, the regulatory institution, which was the union of clans and a multi-layered economic organization in the . The main task of such an association was to select and distribute “the highest quality pasture areas that provide the best conditions for grazing and keeping herds and herds” 140, p.51, i.e. organization of the production process in a particular area. This process was quite complex, multi-stage and affected all subjects of nomadism. A.E. Hudson very subtly noticed the main social processes in the nomadic pastoralism of the Turkic-Mongolian associations. In his opinion, there are two of them: the first is a constant tendency towards segmentation (we are talking, first of all, about the expansion of the family economy - T.Zh.) through branching and separation; the other is a movement towards the integration of small associations into larger ones, by merging 81, p.98. From the predominance in the nomadic society, by the will of economic, political and other circumstances, one of these two trends depended on the formation of a fundamentally new organization - the state.

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Zhumaganbetov T.S.  Ulus of Jochi.  State organization and legal relations in the XIII-XV centuries. (Turkic-Kypchak political and legal traditions in medieval Mongolian statehood). - Almaty: Zheti Zhargy, 2020. - 367 p.

 

ISBN 978-332-666-5

  

FRAGMENT of the monograph.

 

Section 5.3.3.

 

  According to medieval chronicles, the relationship of subordination was formalized by granting labels-decrees to subordinate rulers by the Great Khagan and the ruler of the Jochi ulus. The princes, having received the label, became subjects of the local administrative power of the Jochids. Handing the label to their vassal, the Mongol Khagans thereby included them in their system of legal relations and the sphere of political sovereignty. This fact made this vassal claimant a “legitimate” political and statesman within the borders of the Mongol Empire, while he changed, not for the worse, his position in the system of international relations. For his part, the vassal accepting the label of the kagan recognized the fact of external subjugation and assumed certain duties in relation to the Mongol ruler.

  Thus did: in 1242 the Georgian ruler Rusudan, in 1243 - the Grand Duke of Vladimir Yaroslav II Vsevolodovich, in 1244 - the Seljuk sultan Rukn ad-Din Kay-Khosrov II, and two years later - and his son Kay-Kavus II and others.

  Political and legal registration of unequal relations did not occur immediately after the hostilities, but after a fairly long period. The defeated principalities realized the futility of further resistance, could not find powerful allies for further struggle, and only after that they understood that normative relations with the enemy are a lesser evil than other relations. Any treaty limits the boundaries of uncontrolled arbitrariness, especially from neighboring enemies. On the other hand, the neighboring principalities that received the patronage of the Mongols received a military advantage.

  The protectorate of the principalities of Vladimir, the principalities of Georgia and Asia Minor differed significantly from the protectorate of the Golden Horde over the Balkan countries: Bulgaria and Serbia. E. Khara-Davan reports that after the death of the king of the Danube Bulgarians Ivan Asen II in 1241, the South European nobility were forced to recognize the authority of the ulusbek   and the “temnik” (i.e. general) Nogay [36] . This was facilitated by the campaign of Temnik Nogai against the Empire of Nicaea to free the vassal of the Mongol Empire, the Seljuk sultan, from captivity.

Temnik Nogai was the ulusbek of the westernmost ulus of Jochi. His functions included control over the southern direction, i.e. he monitored the situation throughout the Balkan Peninsula. Thus, the Bulgarian principalities and Serbia came under the control (without direct administrative control) of the inner ulus of the Golden Horde. At the moment, there is no information about any contacts of the Bulgarian princes directly with the rulers of the Jochi ulus and Karakorum. Emir Nogai mentally considered this territory to be his. Khan Batu, during his lifetime, singled out not only the conquered lands, but the whole direction. At the same time, we emphasize that the sovereignty of the external and internal Balkan principalities retained, only outwardly showing signs of a junior foreign policy ally. The views of the Mongols did not always coincide with legal realities. Such a political situation allowed the Balkan monarchs to easily free themselves from political suzerainty immediately after the death of Beklyaribek Nogai.

  Recognition of their subjugation by the Seljuk sultans and Georgian princes from Khan Batu caused resistance from the imperial governor of Asia Minor temnik Baiju. Officially, the Baiju temnik was considered a subordinate of the noyon Chormagun, the Baskak of Iran, who, in turn, nominally recognized the power of Khan Batu. Arab chroniclers (Al-Aini) report that Baiju "was one of the great people of them [the Mongols]... on the part of Batu Khan" [37]. We mentioned above that according to the will of Genghis Khagan Temujin, the Middle East is the western lands from Mongolia, and should belong to the Jochids.

  However, even earlier, the conflict between Khan Batu and the Baiju temnik was used by the opposing clans of pretenders to the throne of the Seljuk Sultanate and the Georgian Principality. In fact, these principalities elected the khans of the Golden Horde as supreme arbiters in resolving local dynastic disputes.

  So, the Georgian princess Rusudan in 1242-1243, having recognized her vassalage from Khan Batu, managed to regain control over the city of Tiflis and used the power of the Mongols to ascend the throne of her son David Narini, with whom she competed his cousin David Ulu, son of George IV.

  In 1250 the Mongols divided Georgia between two brothers [38]. In the same year, they did the same with respect to the children of Grand Duke Yaroslav II Vsevoldovich: Alexander and Andrei [39]. Alexander received Kyiv and Russian lands, and Andrei received the city of Vladimir and the principalities on the Vladimir-Suzdal land.

  The situation in the Seljuk Sultanate was approximately the same. After the defeat at Kesedag, Sultan Giyas ad-Din Kay-Khosrov II was forced to submit to the Mongols. However, he made a diplomatic somersault, recognizing as his master not his winner of the noyon and temnik Baidzhu, but the elder over him, but not identical in interests - Khan Batu. Of the two sons of the sultan who claimed the throne, noion Baiju supported Rukn ad-Din Kylych-Arslan IV, and Khan Batu supported Giyas ad-Din Kay-Khosrov II [40]. The Great Khagan Monke was forced to reckon with the authority of Batu, the eldest in the Genghisid family, and recognize both pretenders to the throne. The Seljuk sultans Kay-Khosrov II and Kılıç-Arslan IV became co-rulers. In 1256, after the death of Khan Batu, the temnik Baiju, with the permission of the great kagan Monke, entered the possessions of the Seljukids, removed Sultan Kay-Khosrov II from power and put his protege Kylych-Arslan IV on the throne [41].

  Thus, the Mongol khans and kagans have a clearly defined policy regarding the protectorate principalities. They resolve local disputes by dividing the vassal country into two opposing principalities. This policy allowed the Mongols to remain the eternal arbiter and excluded the principality from the national liberation movement against the Mongols.

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